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ArticleDecision-making ability, psychopathology, and brain
connectivityHighlightsd Young people have a general decision-making ability, which
we call ‘‘decision acuity’’
d Decision acuity is reflected in how strongly connected certain
brain networks are
d Low decision acuity is associatedwith general social function
psychopathologyMoutoussis et al., 2021, Neuron 109, 1–16








Moutoussis, Garzón, et al. report that
young people have a general decision-
making ability, reflected in the functional
connectivity of specific brain networks
and reduced in those with symptoms of
poor general social function. Thus, it may
be important for understanding aspects
of mental health and its basis in brain
function.ll
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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2021.04.019SUMMARYDecision-making is a cognitive processof central importance for the quality of our lives. Here,we askwhether a
common factor underpins our diverse decision-making abilities. We obtained 32 decision-making measures
from 830 young people and identified a common factor that we call ‘‘decision acuity,’’ which was distinct
from IQ and reflected a generic decision-making ability. Decision acuity was decreased in those with aberrant
thinking and low general social functioning. Crucially, decision acuity and IQ had dissociable brain signatures,
in terms of their associated neural networks of resting-state functional connectivity. Decision acuity was reli-
ably measured, and its relationship with functional connectivity was also stable when measured in the same
individuals 18 months later. Thus, our behavioral and brain data identify a new cognitive construct that under-
pins decision-making ability across multiple domains. This construct may be important for understanding
mental health, particularly regarding poor social function and aberrant thought patterns.INTRODUCTION
Effective decision-making underpins a range of activities that
span economic performance and social adaptation. A computa-
tional characterization of decision-making processes is also
considered important in advancing an understanding of psychi-
atric disorders (Scholl and Klein-Fl€ugge, 2018). Yet, unlike tradi-
tional cognitive constructs such as intelligence, the distribution
and covariation of decision-making characteristics in the popu-
lation is unknown, while the reliability of behavioral tasks typically
used to measure these abilities has been questioned (Brown
et al., 2020; Enkavi et al., 2019; Hedge et al., 2020). Likewise,
although there is a growing knowledge regarding the neural un-
derpinnings of decision-making ability, there is a relative dearth
of knowledge in relation to adolescence and early adulthood, a
crucial period for brain maturation (Giedd, 2004; Whitaker
et al., 2016). Thus, there is an increasing urgency in understand-
ing the neural basis of cognitive development in young people,
including its relationship with brain connectivity (Sripada et al.,
2020). An added motivation here is the observation that a highNeuron 109, 1–1
This is an open access article undproportion of psychopathology emerges during adolescence
and early adulthood (Paus et al., 2008).
Decision-making reflects a complex interplay between mul-
tiple processes that bear on evaluating options and choosing
a course of action. These processes are well characterized
within a reinforcement-learning framework (Dolan and Dayan,
2013; Kable and Glimcher, 2009 Phelps et al., 2014; Sutton
and Barto, 1998). Here, a distinction is made between a reli-
ance on learning how beneficial an action has been in the
past, or alternatively the exploitation of an accurate model
of an environment, in order to infer the consequences of
each action. Computationally, this encompasses model-free
control, accurate model learning (Feher da Silva and Hare,
2020), and model-based evaluation (Daw et al., 2005; Dolan
and Dayan, 2013). Model-based and model-free influences
trade off at different levels in different individuals (Eppinger
et al., 2017; Kool et al., 2017).
A more subtle source of decision variability is the impact of
Pavlovian heuristics, reflecting a propensity to attach value to
specific actions by mere association with whether they lead to6, June 16, 2021 ª 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. 1
er the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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10.1016/j.neuron.2021.04.019reward or punishment (de Boer et al., 2019; Guitart-Masip et al.,
2012; Moutoussis et al., 2018). This conflict is also evident when
individuals balance a need to harvest rewards against potential
dangers inherent in acting within an uncertain environment
(Bach et al., 2020; Loh et al., 2017; O’Neil et al., 2015). This en-
genders a conflict between motivational drives (e.g., approach
versus avoidance) that need resolution in order to enact effective
decisions.
There is much variability in decision-making across individ-
uals. One source of this variability pertains to uncertainty in
decision outcomes, where a tolerance of uncertainty can drive
preferences for risky but, on average, good options (Christopou-
los et al., 2009; Payzan-LeNestour et al., 2013). Likewise, individ-
ual variability in decision-making is seen also in the temporal
domain, where individuals balance exploiting an immediately
available safe option against the possibility of greater, possibly
uncertain, future benefit (Badre et al., 2012; Sutton and Barto,
1998). Finally, as many decisions are enacted in a social context,
understanding the intentions and emotions of others is often
crucial for making decisions and impacts on characteristics
such as one’s propensity to cooperate with others (Fett et al.,
2012; Hula et al., 2015; Luo et al., 2018).
Although the above emphasizes discrete factors as influ-
encing decision-making, we hypothesized that there would
also be covariation across decision-making abilities within the
population, implying shared variance along latent dimensions.
This is analogous to the structure of intelligence, where a cornu-
copia of abilities co-varies with latent dimensions such as gen-
eral and domain-specific intelligence (van der Maas et al.,
2006). On this basis, we employed a broad-ranging decision-
making battery and administered it to 830 14- to 24-year-olds
living in the community (Kiddle et al., 2018). The battery included
tasks tapping into sensitivity to gains and losses (most tasks in
Table 1), the extent to which model-based influences dominate
choice evaluation (Table 1, task D but also tasks C, E, and F), a
propensity to take risks and exhibit impulsivity (tasks B, C, E,
and G), and an ability to make beneficial social judgements
(tasks E and F). We hypothesized that these four domains would
correspond to latent dimensions of decision-making ability
across tasks.We used computational modeling and key descrip-
tive statistics to extract relevant metrics from the tasks (Bach
et al., 2020; Fett et al., 2012; Moutoussis et al., 2011, 2016,
2018; Rigoli et al., 2016; Shahar et al., 2019a). Submitting these
component metrics to factor analysis (see STAR Methods) al-
lowed us to derive latent across-task cognitive constructs un-
derlying decision-making and test for the presence of latent di-
mensions corresponding to the hypothesized cognitive
domains.
We assessed construct stability using the data of 571 of our
participants who performed the decision-making battery a sec-
ond time, at a follow-up 18 months later on average, by charac-
terizing the relationship between the inferred latent cognitive
constructs and external measures such as age, IQ, and mental
health characteristics. Here, we hypothesized that latent dimen-
sions of decision-making would correlate with self-reported psy-
chological dispositions andmental health symptoms. To test this
latter hypothesis, we availed participants’ derived scores for
both general and specific disposition factors (Polek et al.,2 Neuron 109, 1–16, June 16, 20212018) as well as concurrent mental health symptoms (St Clair
et al., 2017).
Crucially, we characterized the neural circuitry underpinning
latent decision-making factors. To achieve this, we analyzed
functional connectivity from resting-state functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) data (rsFC), providing a metric of
coupling between blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) time
series from different brain regions or networks (nodes). Patterns
of rsFC are known to behave as dispositions to a large degree
(Finn et al., 2015), including predicting a subject’s cognitive abil-
ities in diverse domains (Dubois et al., 2018; Kong et al., 2019;
Rosenberg et al., 2016; Smith et al., 2015). Thus, we could ask
whether distinct connectivity networks predicted latent deci-
sion-making factors and whether identified connectivity net-
works had stability over time.
We found evidence for a single dimension of covariation in the
population to which multiple decision-making tasks contributed.
This dimension, which we termed ‘‘decision acuity.’’ reflected
speed of learning, an ability to take account of cognitively distant
outcomes, and low decision variability. We found that decision
acuity has a reliability that was much higher than that reported
for typical decision-making tasks (Moutoussis et al., 2018). In
keeping with this, it was associated with distinct patterns of
rsFC. Finally, decision acuity was characterized by a functional
connectivity signature and a relationship to both psychological
dispositions and symptoms that was distinct to that of IQ.
RESULTS
Decision acuity is an important dimension of decision-
making
A total of 830 young people aged 14–24 were tested using a task
battery assessing diverse components of decision-making (Ta-
ble 1). 349 participants underwent brain fMRI at rest, on the
same day as cognitive testing, to assess resting-state functional
connectivity profiles. Scanned participants had no history of
neuropsychiatric disorder and no suspected psychiatric diag-
nosis on SCID interview. 50 participants with DSM-5 major
depressive disorder were included in the non-scanned sample
to compare the structure of their decision-making to the remain-
ing healthy group. The STAR Methods and supplemental infor-
mation provide further detail on this subgroup.
We extracted 32 decision-making measures from the battery,
which we subjected to factor analyses. Exploratory factor anal-
ysis was followed by confirmatory analysis and out-of-sample
testing of the best factor model (see STAR Methods for details
of the factor-analytic approach, including dimensionality estima-
tion and stability analyses).
Working with the larger, baseline sample, we discerned four
stable decision-making factors. Importantly, only the first of
these loaded on measures from multiple tasks. We named
this factor decision acuity, or d, as it loaded negatively on de-
cision variability measures, especially decision temperature,
and loaded positively on measures contributing to profitable
decision-making, such as low temporal discounting and faster
learning rates (Figure 1; Table S1). Thus, participants with high
d had low decision variability in economic-risk, information-
gathering, Go-NoGo, and Two-Step tasks. They had fast
Table 1. Decision-making task battery







A. Go-NoGo task (Guitart-
Masip et al., 2012)
Default (Pavlovian)
propensities for action and
ability to modify them
Impact of gains and losses
on choice
Pavlovian biases (i.e.,
propensity to engage in
action in order to obtain
rewards and to abstain from




Instrumental learning rate in
the appetitive and aversive
domains.
1. Pavlovian bias.
2. and 3. Reaction times for
action choices in the context
of threat versus opportunity.
4. Sensitivity to outcomes.













Impact of gains and losses
on choice
Baseline taste for gambling.
Risk avoidance (preference
for outcome distributions of
low variance).
9. Overall preference for
gambling over known
returns.
10. Preference weight for
variance, compared to the
mean, of an outcome
distribution, named
‘‘economic risk preference.’’
11. Effect of outcome
distribution asymmetry
(skewness) on preferences.






Impact of gains and losses
on choice
Ability for complex planning
Willingness to expose
oneself to different levels of
risk for the sake of amassing
rewards.
Ability to learn about time-
dependent hazards and plan
efficient sensorimotor





behavioral measures in the
task. Approximately
corresponding to sensitivity
to overall level of threat,
sensitivity to the time
dependency of threat, and
overall performance.
D. Two-step task (Daw
et al., 2011)
Ability for complex planning
Impact of gains and losses
on choice
Strength of ‘‘model-free’’
(i.e., based on directly






tendency to shift in decisions









(propensity of learning to
affect not just the current
state but also others related
to it).
(Continued on next page)
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Table 1. Continued







E. Information gathering task
(Moutoussis et al., 2011)
Risk taking/impulsivity
Ability for complex planning
Impact of gains and losses
on choice
Assessment of whether
future decisions will be more
advantageous if one gathers
more information.
21. Information sampling
noise, which determines not
only decision variability but
also effective depth of
planning.
22. Subjective cost of every
piece of information asked
for when experimenter
imposes no such price
explicitly.




trustee task (Fett et al., 2012)
Understanding the
preferences of others (social
cognition)
Ability for complex planning
Impact of gains and losses
on choice
Overall strategies used to
elicit cooperation and avoid
being exploited by one’s
anonymous task partner.
25. Initial trust (i.e., the
amount given by the investor
to the trustee before they
have any specific information
about them).
26. Cooperativeness:
average degree to which
investor and trustee tended
to respond to reductions (or




responding to the partner’s
change in contribution.
G. Interpersonal-discounting
task (Moutoussis et al., 2016)
Understanding the











29. Relevance of others’




about one’s own tastes in
this domain.
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Note that a decision temperature parameter can always be
re-written as the inverse of reward (and/or loss) sensitivity.
Hence, the prominent role of negatively loading temperature
parameters in d supports our a priori hypothesis that reward
sensitivity constitutes an important shared characteristic
across tasks.
In the baseline sample, we confirmed that d correlated with
profitable decision-making by estimating a measure of aggre-
gate task performance, based on net points won across tasks
and separate from components of d (Pearson r = 0.50, p <
1e10; see supplemental information, part C, for details).
Remarkably, d predicted this aggregate measure of perfor-
mance independently from IQ, providing supportive evidence4 Neuron 109, 1–16, June 16, 2021for convergent validity with directly measured task performance.
In fact, the effect of IQ on performance depended on its shared
variance with d (the caveat here being that performance in tasks
and d share common-method variance).
The other three factors derived from this analysis addressed
within-task behavior rather than hypothesized global decision-
making constructs and were thus of peripheral interest here.
The second selected the delegated inter-temporal discounting
task (D), the third the information-gathering task (E), and the
fourth the economic risk preference task (C) (Figure S2). As ex-
pected, given that each task had a unique focus, constituent
cognitive measures showed high uniqueness scores across all
factors. 22 of the 32 measures had uniqueness > 80%
(Figure 1B).
Figure 1. Decision acuity
(A) Decision acuity common factor over cognitive
parameters, based on the validated four-factor so-
lution. Measure labels are shortened versions of
descriptions in Table 1, and letters in brackets are
task labels referring to Table 1. The top half of var-
iables load positively, while gray vertical lines give a
visual indication of which measures are important,
being the thresholds used for inclusion of variables
in the confirmatory analyses.
(B) Decision acuity was strongly correlated between
baseline and follow-up, as expected for a disposi-
tional measure. Mauve is the regression line, and
black is the identity line.
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We first examined how d depended on age, a key indicator of
development. We used linear mixed effects (LME) analysis with
participant as random effect, two measurement time points of
decision acuity and IQ, and one (baseline) score per participant
for dispositions, self-reported sex and socioeconomic variables.
LME analysis modeled age both longitudinally and cross-
sectionally. This analysis showed that the d varied in the same
manner with age within or across participants (beta = 0.24,
SE = 0.022, p  0.0 [undetectable]), suggesting that d increased
with development. d was stable from baseline to follow-up,
although slightly less so than IQ was (Wechsler Abbreviated
Scale of Intelligence, WASI) (r = 0.68, p  0.0 for d; 0.77, p 
0.0 for WASI IQ; 95% CI for the difference = 0.135 to 0.044;
Figure 1B). These estimates give a conservative estimate of
discriminant validity of d versus IQ D = 0.76, which is satisfactory
(<0.85) (Voorhees et al., 2016). d increased with testing wave (ef-
fect size = 0.38, p  0.0). We found no evidence here, or in sub-
sequent analyses, for more complex models of age (curvilinear
effects or interactions with sex).
We confirmed that both matrix and vocabulary raw IQ sub-
scores robustly correlated with d (fixed-effect betas = 0.088,
0.179, SE = 0.008, 0.018, p  0.0). However, inclusion of raw
IQ scores did not affect the significance of age as a regressor
(age beta = 0.121, SE = 0.020, p  0.0). Therefore, not only did
decision acuity increase with age in our sample but so did the
component that was independent of IQ abilities, suggesting
that IQ and d developed in parallel with age. Together, IQ sub-
scores and age accounted for r2adj = 0.31 of the variance in
d at baseline.
With respect to self-reported sex, d scores for males were
higher than those of females at baseline (t test p = 8.6e–5, ef-
fect size = 0.27). However, if both IQ subscores and age were
entered in LME, the correlation between d and self-reported
sex was no longer significant. Thus, any uncorrected sex
dependence is likely to be due to participant self-selection.
That is, among males, more participants of higher IQ volun-
teered relative to among females. d showed no significantage 3 sex dependence (controlling for
IQ, sex p = 0.39, age 3 sex p = 0.21).
As to socioeconomic factors affecting
the development of d, we noted an in-
crease with parental education (p =0.0051, beta = 0.19, SE = 0.067) but no significant association
with neighborhood deprivation (p = 0.09).
Mental health factors and their association with
decision acuity
Next, we examined the relationship between d and both psycho-
logical dispositions and symptoms. Note that in our study,
involvingmainly healthy adolescents and young adults, symptom-
atology refers to the nature and extent of self-reported mental
health symptoms rather than diagnosable clinical disorders.
Thus, we used factor scores validated specifically for our sample
(Polek et al., 2018; St Clair et al., 2017), which indicated that dis-
positions and symptoms in our sample were well described by bi-
factor models. Each bifactor model comprises a superordinate
‘‘general factor’’ and subordinate ‘‘specific factors.’’ Dispositions
comprise a general social functioning factor (‘‘sociality’’) and four
specific factors: social sensitivity, sensation seeking, effortful con-
trol, and suspiciousness. Symptoms comprise a general distress
factor, a.k.a. ‘‘p factor’’ (Caspi et al., 2014; Patalay et al., 2015),
and five specific factors: mood, self-confidence, worry, aberrant
thinking, and antisocial behavior.
d was significantly predicted by dispositions, over and above
its relationship with intelligence. We first regressed all symptom
disposition factor scores against d, allowing all factors to
compete in explaining variance in LME models with participant
intercept as random effect. d was significantly and positively
related to the general disposition factor, sociality (p = 0.0002,
standardized beta, a.k.a. bz = 0.36, SE(bz) = 0.096). In models
that included raw IQ scores and age, both variables significantly
predicted d and improved model fit (Baysian Information Crite-
rion, a.k.a BIC = 4,873 versus 5,083 without IQ). Importantly, in-
clusion of IQ strengthened the significance of sociality (p =
0.0001, bz = 0.32, SE(bz) = 0.084; see Table 2).
Among symptom scores, dwasmost strongly associated with
aberrant thinking, which draws on schizotypy and obsessional-
ity. Covarying for IQ, but not dispositions, showed that d signifi-
cantly decreased with higher aberrant thinking (p = 0.016,
beta = 0.16, SE = 0.066), higher general distress (p = 0.048,Neuron 109, 1–16, June 16, 2021 5
Table 2. Key steps in regression analyses
Independent variable
A. Symptoms only (p value
for fixed effects beta; time-
dependent LME)
B. Dispositions only (p value
for beta; baseline only)
C. Symptoms and dispositions








Antisocial behavior SF 0.381 – 0.912
Worry SF 0.014* – 0.875
Aberrant thinking SF 0.016* – 0.074#




Social sensitivity – 0.656 –
Sensation seeking – 0.987 –
Effortful control – 0.959 –
Suspiciousness – 0.014* –
Age <0.0001*** 0.0002*** <0.0001***
Vocabulary IQ (raw score) <0.0001*** <0.0001*** <0.0001***
Matrix IQ (raw score) <0.0001*** <0.0001*** <0.0001***
*significant at p = 0.05.
**significant at p = 0.005.
***significant at p < 0.001.
#trend level significance at p = 0.05.
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10.1016/j.neuron.2021.04.019beta = 0.12, SE = 0.057), but lower worry (p = 0.014, beta =
0.16, SE = 0.063). However, covarying for sociality (with or
without other dispositions) reduced the significance of aberrant
thinking, to trend level (p = 0.074, beta = 0.10, SE = 0.053),
and abolished the relationship with other symptom dimensions
(symptom general factor: distress, p = 0.82, others ranging
from p = 0.35 to 0.99). By itself, IQ was significantly correlated
to aberrant thinking (matrix p = 0.013, vocabulary p = 0.0001)
and less so general distress (matrix p = 0.012, vocabulary p =
0.47). Again, all analyses linearly accounted for age and did not
benefit from more complex models of age.
Patterns of brain connectivity are associated with
decision acuity differently from IQ
Out of 313 healthy subjects who were scanned at baseline, we
discarded baseline scans without acceptable imaging data qual-
ity (3), whoseME-ICA denoising did not converge (4), or who had
excessive motion while scanning (8), leaving 298 baseline scans
for analysis. A further three subjects were removed from ana-
lyses involving IQ scores as they did not complete the IQ tests,
leaving 295 subjects for analysis. A population-average parcella-
tion of brain data was obtained using independent component
analysis in our sample, resulting in 168 networks (nodes) within
each of which activity was highly correlated. Patterns of connec-
tivity between nodes were then estimated as partial correlation
values, or resting-state functional connectivity (rsFC). We then
used rsFC values as features in sparse partial least-squares
(SPLS) analyses to predict decision acuity and composite IQ.
We used cross-validation and out-of-sample predictive testing
to prevent overfitting. Predictive accuracy was assessed as6 Neuron 109, 1–16, June 16, 2021Pearson’s correlation coefficient between true scores and
model-predicted values. We report associations between
predicted and observed decision acuity after correcting for
scanner-related and other covariates. This ensures that it is the
information carried by the functional connectivity alone that pre-
dicts cognitive abilities. (See STAR Methods for details; Figure 2
illustrates the structure of the predictive testing.)
Scores for d predicted on the basis of functional connectivity,
dpr, significantly correlated with measured d controlling for de-
mographic and imaging-related covariates (see STAR Methods
for details; r = 0.145, p < 106). The correlation between
measured IQ and IQ predicted on the basis of rsFC using all con-
nections was lower but also significant (r = 0.092, p = 9e–5).
To interpret the neuroanatomical structure of the predictive
model, we first partitioned the nodes into anatomically meaning-
ful ‘‘modules’’ using a community detection algorithm (Blondel
et al., 2008) and then asked howwell each of thesemodules pre-
dicted d. The community detection algorithm clustered the no-
des into disjoint communities or modules based on the strength
of their intrinsic connectivity, to some extent analogous to large-
scale functional networks. As shown in Figure 2, we obtained the
following modules: anterior temporal cortex including the medial
temporal lobe (ATC); frontal pole (FPL); frontoparietal control
network (FPN); left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (LDC); medial
prefrontal cortex (MPC); orbitofrontal cortex, medial and lateral
(OFC); opercular cortex (OPC); posterior cingulate cortex
(PCC); posterior temporal cortex (PTC); right dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex (RDC); subcortical (SUB); salience network
(SAN); somatosensory and motor areas (SMT); and visual re-
gions (VIS). We fitted a different SPLS model to the subset of
Figure 2. Structure of predictive testing
Flow diagram of the nested cross-validation pipeline used to estimate how strongly decision acuity (similarly for IQ) could be predicted from brain data.
Essentially, a predictive model was derived from training folds and then applied to the brain data from test folds to derive predicted values for the decision acuity
for each individual. This could then be comparedwith the experimentally derived decision acuity. In our study, NB = 200, NF1 = 20, NF2 = 10, NR = 5, andNP = 100. X
corresponds to the rsFC features and y to the scores predicted (d or IQ).
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The correlation between measured and predicted d scores
was significant for the FPN, MPC, OFC, OPC, PCC, SMT,
and VIS modules after correction for multiple tests (Figure 4A;
Table 2), with the strongest correlations for OFC, PCC, and
SMT. For the PCC and SMT modules, the correlation coeffi-
cients exceeded to a small degree the correlation for a model
employing all possible connections. This can best be explained
as a result of feature selection. In the full model, it is harder to
select just the right features and protect against over-fitting, re-
sulting in a greater penalty in predictive accuracy. On the other
hand, the model trained on a smaller set of features alone is
less likely to overfit. This paradoxical increase in accuracy for
a model with less features is known to be stronger when the
number of observations is small, relative to the number of fea-
tures (Chu et al., 2012), which is the case in our dataset. The
different modules comprised diverse numbers of nodes, but
there was no significant association between the number of
model features and the correlation between observed and pre-dicted scores (d: r = 0.356, p = 0.193; IQ composite scores: r =
0.158, p = 0.574).
Out of 235 subjects who were scanned at follow-up, adhering
to the same criteria as for the baseline data, we discarded those
without acceptable imaging data quality (4), whose ME-ICA
denoising did not converge (5), and who presented with exces-
sive motion (3), leaving 223 subjects available for analysis. We
applied the model trained on the baseline data to the follow-up
data (see STAR Methods) for the modules where the prediction
was significant at baseline. Importantly, the prediction of a sub-
ject at follow-up did not involve their own rsFC baseline data, as
this would inflate the estimate of predictive performance. The
baseline model predicted significantly the follow-up d values
based on the follow-up connectivity data when using either all
the connections or those with networks in the FPN, MPC,
OFC, and SMT modules, controlling for demographic and imag-
ing-related covariates, and correcting for multiple tests (Fig-
ure 4B; Table 3).
To assess whether d and IQ can be predicted by specific
rsFC patterns or, alternatively, whether both are underpinnedNeuron 109, 1–16, June 16, 2021 7
Figure 3. Brain networks
Modules detected by the community structure algorithm. The 168 nodes of the parcellation were clustered in 14 modules with high average rsFC among
their nodes. ATC, anterior temporal cortex including the medial temporal lobe; FPL, frontal pole; FPN, frontoparietal control network; LDC, left dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex; MPC, medial prefrontal cortex; OFC, orbitofrontal cortex, medial and lateral; OPC, opercular cortex; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex;
PTC, posterior temporal cortex; RDC, right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; SUB, subcortical; SAN, salience network; SMT, somatosensory and motor
areas; VIS, visual regions.
ll
OPEN ACCESS Article
Please cite this article in press as: Moutoussis et al., Decision-making ability, psychopathology, and brain connectivity, Neuron (2021), https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.neuron.2021.04.019by similar patterns of neural connectivity, we controlled the
partial correlation coefficients between dpr and d, on top of
the nuisance covariates previously included, for IQ. In a com-
plementary manner, we controlled the partial correlation be-
tween IQpr and IQ, on top of the nuisance covariates, for d. Af-
ter correction for IQ composite scores, and correcting for
multiple comparisons, the correlation between d and dpr re-
mained significant for OPC, PCC, and SMT (Figure 5A; Table
2), suggesting that these modules reflect decision acuity
over and above their relation to IQ. On the other hand, the cor-
relation between IQpr and IQ was significant for OPC and PTC
after controlling for d (Figure 5B; Table 3), suggesting that
these modules reflect IQ over and above their relation to de-
cision acuity. These analyses demonstrate that decision acu-
ity and IQ have distinguishable and specific signatures in
functional connectivity networks: decision acuity taps on the
default mode, salience, and sensorimotor networks, whereas
IQ taps on the salience network but also on temporal net-
works associated with language processing.8 Neuron 109, 1–16, June 16, 2021DISCUSSION
To our knowledge, this is the first study characterizing a dimen-
sional structure in core decision-making from an epidemiologi-
cally informed sample of adolescents and young adults. We
found that decision-making performance could be described
by a broad construct receiving contributions from multiple do-
mains of cognition. We termed this decision acuity, d. In our
sample, d showed satisfactory longitudinal stability, increased
with age and with IQ. d also had specific associations with
mental health measures, over and above IQ. Decision acuity
was related to brain function, showing a temporally stable asso-
ciation with rsFC, involving networks previously implicated in de-
cision-making processes. Moreover, rsFC patterns associated
with d and IQ were distinguishable and specific despite showing
a degree of overlap.
Decision acuity had an interpretable structure, reflecting a fa-
cility for good decision-making. Decision acuity increased as
decision variability lessened, evidenced by its loadings on
Figure 4. Observed versus predicted decision acuity by testing wave
Model predictive performance for each of the functional modules.
(A) Coefficient for the correlation between observed d and dpr predicted by models trained on all connections and the connections involving nodes in each
module.
(B) Correlation between observed d and dpr predicted by models trained on the baseline data. Only modules for which the prediction was significant at baseline
are shown here. All the models included as covariates demographic and imaging-related factors (brain volume, scanning site, head motion; see STARMethods).
The whiskers indicate the intervals containing the lower 95% probability mass (corresponding to one-tailed tests) for the null distribution, obtained via permu-
tation of the subjects to derive the significance of the correlation between predicted and measured scores (see STAR Methods). The correlation is significant
(uncorrected) when it falls above the whisker. *significant uncorrected; **significant with FDR correction for the 15 tests.
ATC, anterior temporal cortex including the medial temporal lobe; FPL, frontal pole; FPN, frontoparietal control network; LDC, left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex;
MPC, medial prefrontal cortex; OFC, orbitofrontal cortex, medial and lateral; OPC, opercular cortex; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex; PTC, posterior temporal
cortex; RDC, right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; SUB, subcortical; SAN, salience network; SMT, somatosensory and motor areas; VIS, visual regions.
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10.1016/j.neuron.2021.04.019decision-noise-like parameters across all tasks that provided
such measures. The most prominent loadings were inverse tem-
perature parameters, also known as reward sensitivities. By defi-
nition, high temperature (a.k.a. reduced reward sensitivity)
agents are less motivated about relevant outcomes, supporting
our hypothesis that reward sensitivity loaded on an important
common factor. However, d also received substantial contribu-
tions from measures that did not directly reflect reward sensi-
tivity but characterized good decision-making. These included
low temporal discounting, fast reaction times, high learning
rates, baseline trust in others, low propensity for retaliation,
low propensity to show a Pavlovian bias, and low lapse rates.
Such non-temperature constructs may also be linked to decision
variability, albeit less directly.
An interesting interpretation of this pattern is that lower-acuity
participants may find it too costly to eliminate computational er-
rors in the fast pace of many tasks. For example, the computa-
tions required tomake decisions about outcomes far in the future
may be hard to perform for low-d agents, resulting in discount-
ing-like behavior. Lapse rates may be understood as ‘‘floor’’ er-
ror rates imposed by computational costs. That is, decision-
making independent of the value of outcomes may take place
when these values are too difficult to compute. Higher decision
variability may also be driven by effective beliefs about the world,
for example, a belief that overvalues exploration. If working out
the correct action is too difficult, trial and error is a brute-forcealternative, providing a compensatory or adaptation strategy in
the face of limited cognitive resources. Overall, the contrast of
noise with precision-enhancing measures in this factor is remi-
niscent of the association between low ability to reach goals
and low policy confidence in active inference (Friston et al.,
2013). The agnostic derivation but interpretable nature of d can
thus be seen as an example of data-driven ontology (Eisenberg
et al., 2019).
One remarkable result of our study is the relatively high reli-
ability of our new construct. This is important because many
behavioral tasks have low test-retest reliability (Enkavi et al.,
2019), an issue that also applies to some of the decision-making
measures used in our battery (Moutoussis et al., 2018; Shahar
et al., 2019a). A discordance in reliability between the individual
decision-making tasks and our decision acuity construct is likely
to stem from the fact that the latter reflects shared variance
across multiple independent measures. Similarly, self-report
surveys previously shown to have high reliability typically involve
multiple questions to assess underlying constructs (Enkavi et al.,
2019), suggesting that, to obtain reliable decision-making mea-
sures, it is useful to use multiple tasks. d also showed satisfac-
tory discriminant validity with respect to IQ, which is evidence
that it provides distinct meaningful information. Nonetheless, it
would be advantageous if individual decision-making measures
were refined to improve their reliability and construct validity,
and an important example here relates to the task assessingNeuron 109, 1–16, June 16, 2021 9
Table 3. Correlation coefficients between observed and predicted scores
Prediction of d at baseline (Figure 3A) Prediction of d at follow-up (Figure 3B)
Prediction of d at baseline controlling for
IQ (Figure 3C)
Prediction of IQ at baseline controlling for
d (Figure 3D)
Network r p value p value (FDR corr.) r p value p value (FDR corr.) r p value p value (FDR corr.) r p value p value (FDR corr.)
All 0.145 <1e–6 <1e–6** 0.081 0.005 0.018** 0.021 0.241 0.651 0.054 0.972 1.000
ATC 0.038 0.116 0.158 0.052 0.048 0.102* 0.018 0.304 0.651 0.169 1.000 1.000
FPL 0.019 0.773 0.773 0.023 0.242 0.363 0.016 0.712 1.000 0.036 0.130 0.488
FPN 0.059 0.019 0.036** 0.085 0.002 0.012** 0.007 0.605 1.000 0.045 0.979 1.000
LDC 0.023 0.218 0.273 0.055 0.943 0.985 0.051 0.950 1.000 0.069 0.015 0.073*
MPC 0.069 0.004 0.011** 0.118 9.38e–05 7.03e–04** 0.017 0.268 0.651 0.052 0.960 1.000
OFC 0.143 <1e–6 <1e–6** 0.083 0.006 0.018** 0.032 0.153 0.574 0.013 0.320 0.960
OPC 0.123 6.79e–06 2.04e–05** 0.015 0.333 0.455 0.181 <1e–6 <1e–6** 0.170 <1e–6 <1e–6**
PCC 0.199 <1e–6 <1e–6** 0.049 0.915 0.985 0.104 2.11e–04 0.001** 0.044 0.955 1.000
PTC 0.023 0.769 0.773 0.167 <1e–6 3e–06** 0.035 0.877 1.000 0.113 7.2e–05 5.4e–04**
RDC 0.037 0.047 0.078* 0.072 0.985 0.985 0.101 1.000 1.000 0.019 0.727 1.000
SAN 0.034 0.106 0.158 0.004 0.448 0.560 0.138 1.000 1.000 0.103 1.000 1.000
SMT 0.159 <1ev6 <1e–6** 0.068 0.010 0.025** 0.107 2.77e–05 2.07e–04** 0.095 1.000 1.000
SUB 0.006 0.577 0.666 0.022 0.229 0.363 0.020 0.774 1.000 0.061 0.980 1.000
VIS 0.062 0.012 0.025** 0.033 0.178 0.334 0.078 0.998 1.000 0.008 0.606 1.000














































































































































Figure 5. Networks specific to decision acuity versus specific to IQ
Predictive performance for d and IQ when correcting for each other.
(A) As in Figure 4A, correlation between observed d and dpr, but here additionally correcting for IQ in addition to demographic and imaging-related factors (brain
volume, scanning site, head motion; see STAR Methods).
(B) Correlation between observed and predicted IQ, but correcting for imaging related factors and decision acuity.
In all plots, the leftmost bar corresponds to themodel that includes all connections. The whiskers indicate the intervals containing the lower 95%probability mass
(corresponding to one-tailed tests) for the null distribution, obtained via permutation of the subjects to derive the significance of the correlation between predicted
and measured scores (see STARMethods). The correlation is significant (uncorrected) when it falls above the whisker. *significant uncorrected; **significant with
FDR correction for the 15 tests. Abbreviations as per Figure 4.
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Developmentally, high decision acuity was robustly associated
with age, increasing by 0.37 SD from age 14 to 24. This is impor-
tant because component parameters have been found to have
less robust relationships with age in this same sample (Moutous-
sis et al., 2016, 2018). That d varied similarly with age across and
within participants offers some reassurance that its age depen-
dence here is not a practice effect. d also increased with parental
education, a developmentally important socio-economic indicator
(McDermott et al., 2019), again independently of IQ. These posi-
tive associations of dmay reflect adolescents and younger adults
getting more confident in the outcomes of their actions as a func-
tion of maturation but also of a supportive environment.
Mental health indices were associated with d, over and above
IQ. d decreased with p factor (general distress factor) and an
aberrant thinking (schizotypy/obsessionality) specific factor
and increased with a worry-specific factor but, perhaps counter-
intuitively, was not associated with the mood-specific factor.
d explained a small proportion of the variance in mental health,
as is often the case for risk factors in community samples like
ours (Pearson et al., 2015). Importantly, d was most strongly
associated with the general disposition factor sociality, which
statistically explained most of the relation between d and symp-
toms. Our finding that participants with lower decision acuity had
higher residual symptoms (i.e., unrelated to general distress)
within the domain of aberrant thinking is consistent with existing
literature (Ettinger et al., 2015).Future mental health research can build on our evidence that
decision acuity may reflect a risk factor for schizotypy/compul-
sivity/obsessionality (aberrant thinking) and general distress (p
factor). Thus, decision acuity may confer (or indicate) vulnera-
bility to specific psychopathologies. At the same time, we found
that low decision acuity was robustly associated with poor social
functioning. Further research is needed to trace the pathways
between decision acuity, adaptive social function, and psychiat-
ric symptoms, especially as poor social functioning may confer a
greater functional impact to psychiatric symptoms. Finally, a
weak relationship with common mental disorder symptom-
atology, such as anxiety and depression, was a surprise and pro-
vides a challenge for the enterprise of identifying computational
phenotypes. Replicating these results and establishing their
causes beyond the goals of our study can provide new research
directions for computational psychiatry, and this dovetails with
recent work in related fields (Chen et al., 2020; Sripada
et al., 2020).
Decision acuity was also associated with specific, distributed
patterns of resting-state brain connectivity (Dubois et al., 2018;
Smith et al., 2015). The whole-brain, connectivity-based predic-
tive model depended on connections spread across the entire
brain, implying that d, like IQ, depends on more extensive sys-
tems than those typically observed for state-tapping tasks in
functional imaging studies (e.g., medial prefrontal, dorsolateral
prefrontal). Strikingly, the pattern of connections predicting
d was structured, with connections involving nodes in FPN,
MPC, OFC, OPC, PCC, SMT, and VIS being most predictive ofNeuron 109, 1–16, June 16, 2021 11
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10.1016/j.neuron.2021.04.019d, irrespective of age and sex. Furthermore, the models trained
at baseline on all the features, as well as those restricted on fea-
tures within FPN, MPC, OFC, and SMT, were also predictive of
d at follow-up, demonstrating the stability of the relationship be-
tween rsFC in these modules and d over time.
Reassuringly, decision acuity was predicted by connections
involving MPC and OFC, regions typically recruited by decision-
making tasks. Circuits involving these regions receive highly pro-
cessed sensory information and support instrumental behavior by
representing subjective value of stimuli and choices (Garvert et al.,
2015; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006; Rushworth et al., 2011).
The OFC also supports credit assignment during reward learning
(Jochamet al., 2016;Walton et al., 2010) probably by representing
an association between stimuli and outcomes (Boorman et al.,
2016; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006; Stalnaker et al., 2018).
Finally, theOFChas also been suggested to support the represen-
tation of latent states necessary to navigate decision-making
tasks (Schuck et al., 2016; Wilson et al., 2014). Similarly, involve-
ment of the PCC, FPN, and SMT is not surprising. Activity in the
PCC has been observed during decision-making tasks, and it
has been suggested that the PCC monitors the environment to
detect transitions to new states (Pearson et al., 2011). Although
the frontoparietal circuit has mainly been associated with work-
ing-memory task performance (Murray et al., 2017), it has been
shown that working memory also contributes to learning in typical
reinforcement learning tasks (Collins et al., 2017; Collins and
Frank, 2018). Finally, connections involving motor and somato-
sensory areas may contribute to adaptive decision-making. For
example, in our tasks, motor actions were orthogonalized with
respect to choices, and recent work suggests that only the
more capable decision-makers successfully uncouple motor ac-
tion and option choice (Shahar et al., 2019b). Hence, SMT con-
nectivity may be important to realize this decoupling. Similarly,
active suppression of Pavlovian tendencies that can corrupt
optimal decision-making may also involve optimal sensorimotor
functioning (Cavanagh et al., 2013; Swart et al., 2018).
Our ability to predict decision acuity at baseline when control-
ling for IQ, and IQ when controlling for decision acuity, based on
particular connectivity modules supports the idea that both con-
structs have specific signatures in rsFC. This suggests that deci-
sion acuity has a neurobiological substrate distinct from that of
IQ and adds to the validation of their distinctiveness suggested
by their differential association with psychological measures.
Although IQ absorbed the predictive ability of the connections
within the FPN, the MPC, and OFC, decision acuity tapped on
modules within the default mode (PCC), opercular (OPC), and
sensorimotor (SMT) networks independently of IQ. On the other
hand, IQ tapped on the opercular network (OPC), too, but also on
temporal networks associated with language processing (PTC),
consistent with the vocabulary subscale of IQ being heavily
reliant on linguistic ability (Axelrod, 2002). Interestingly, connec-
tions within the OPC, which encompasses the insula, indepen-
dently contributed to predicting both decision acuity and IQ at
baseline. As part of a salience network, these regions may
contribute to modulation of the switching between internally
and externally directed cognitions (Uddin, 2015).
Important questions for future research include whether deci-
sion acuity is a superordinate latent trait of decision-making and12 Neuron 109, 1–16, June 16, 2021whether it relates to dimensions such as risk preference, model-
based choice, and aspects of social competence. Crucially,
studies informed by the associations found here (aberrant
thinking, sociality) can be extended to clinical populations to
assess the generality of the findings, as well as to determine
whether decision acuity might inform diagnosis and treatment
plans for individual psychiatric patients. Such clinical studies
can profit from our finding that rsFC can predict (estimate) deci-
sion acuity, particularly as rsFC data can be acquired quickly,
does not impose cognitive demands, and can be administered
repeatedly to characterize patients through different phases of
a disorder. This type of extension of our approach will benefit
from advances in computational modeling of cognitive and
behavioral data (Huys et al., 2016), as well as improvements in
imaging data collection, processing, and characterization (Ciric
et al., 2018; Kundu et al., 2017; Todd et al., 2016; Vidaurre
et al., 2017), including initiatives to acquire high-quality large-
scale datasets (Kiddle et al., 2018; Van Essen et al., 2013).
We acknowledge limitations of the present study. We had a
retention rate between baseline and follow-up of 70%. Although
this is acceptable, it meant that our follow-up samplewas smaller,
and we had reduced power to detect longitudinal effects.
Although epidemiologically stratified, our sample was a volunteer
one, introducing potential self-selection biases. Our sample did
not allow for many-way (cognitive-brain-developmental-clinical)
analyses. Finally, the reliability and ecological validity of task-
based measures would benefit from further improvement.
Conclusion
We describe a new cognitive construct—decision acuity—that
captures global decision-making ability. High decision acuity
prominently reflected low decision variability. Decision acuity
showed acceptable reliability, increased with age, and was
associated with mental health symptoms independently of intel-
ligence. Crucially, it was associated with distinctive resting-state
networks, in particular in brain regions typically engaged by de-
cision-making tasks. The association between decision acuity
and functional connectivity was temporally stable and distinct
from that of IQ.
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MATLAB Mathworks RRID: SCR_001622; https://
www.mathworks.com/
R package The R Foundation RRID: SCR_001905; https://
www.r-project.org
ME-ICA Kundu et al., 2017 https://afni.nimh.nih.gov/
pub/dist/src/pkundu/
README.meica
FSL Smith et al., 2004 RRID: SCR_002823; https://
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SPLS R library Chun and Keleş, 2010 https://cran.r-project.org/
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EXPERIMENTAL MODEL AND SUBJECTS DETAILS
Human subjects
Participants were sampled from a pool of c. 2400 community-dwelling young people and formed a ‘cognitive cohort’. Participants
were contacted at random from 5 age bins (14-16,16-18 etc.), until each recruited age bin had approximately equal proportions
of females andmales. The proportion of non-white-English youngsters in our study was within 10%of that of themost recent census.
Significant neuropsychiatric problems were screened out by self-report, and recruitment sources were selected for the sample to be
as representative as possible of the healthy population (Kiddle et al., 2018).We continued to invite people from the larger pool into the
cognitive cohort, until our target number of 780 ‘cognitive’ participants was completed. Of these, 300were invited forMRI brain scan-
ning. They were equally distributed in the 5 age bins as above, and equal Female:Male ratio. At the time of registering with the study,
participants were asked to tick: Sex: ‘Female’ or ‘Male’. All participants that gave data for decision acuity and imaging analyses
ticked one or the other box. It was not clarified if some understood the question as ‘gender identity’, socially attributed or biological
category. Due to the phrasing ‘Sex:’ we expect that most participants understood the question to mean ‘self-reported estimate of
biological sex’, but this is a tentative interpretation.
In addition, they were screened for absence of a history or presence of mental health disorder, neurological or major health prob-
lem, or learning disability. Initial screening was by self-report but was confirmed by SCID-II interview and IQ testing.
We supplemented this non-healthcare-seeking sample with 50 young people recently diagnosed with DSM-5 major depressive
disorder. Of these, 38 gave decision-making battery data for decision-acuity analyses (M = 11,F = 27). Thus, the main sample
was representative of the healthy wider population, but a smaller depression group was also analyzed to test whether the structure
of decision-making and the relevant brain measures identified in the healthy population also extended to this health-seeking group.
The depressed cohort was excluded from MRI analyses reported here.
Participants (and their parents, if less than 16 years old) gave informed consent to participate in the study. The study was approved
by the Cambridge Ethics Committee (12/EE/0250).
METHOD DETAILS
Sample size estimation
Our key sample size estimation pertained to the neuroimaging sample, and resulted in the estimate of N = 300. The cognitive-task
sample was then as large as study resources allowed, including resources needed to re-telephone participants who had initially given
consent but did not immediately respond to an invitation of follow-up, up to achieving a follow-up rate of at least 70%. In summary,
estimation of the key, neuroimaging cohort sample size proceeded as follows.
At the time of study design, there were no specific studies to provide a rigorous analysis for rsFC developmental, longitudinal sam-
ple size estimation. We therefore relied on a roughly comparable study which allowed for imaging developmental effect. This study
used a cohort of 387 participants, who provided 829 structural MRI scans (Giedd, 2004). We thus aimed for 300 participants, a num-
ber whichwas logistically accessible, and optimized power by selecting parameters (ageminimum andwidth) of age-bins and follow-
up intervals, using published gray-matter volume data as a proxy for the individual variation that we should have power to detect.
Quadratic growth curves were fitted to the data from the published study above, and study parameters varied in silico to minimize
variance of the estimated parameters of the growth-curves. Simulations showed a plateauing of efficiency if the overall age rangewas
reduced to less than 10 years, or the width of age-bins to less than 2 years. Parameter accuracy improved with follow-up interval and
deteriorated if the follow-up was shorter than 6 months. Therefore, we aimed for 5 age bins times 2 years width, and selected a min-
imum interval of 12 months, aiming at about 18 month average. This was well above 6 months, reduced the chance of demographic
loss (moving far away) and allowed adequate time to repeat invitations for participants that did not immediately respond to follow-up
invitations.
Decision-making Task Battery
We selected seven tasks tapping fundamental decision-making with evidence linking them to bothmental health symptoms and neu-
ral mechanisms (Table 1 in main text). First, a Go-NoGo task (Guitart-Masip et al., 2012) provided measures relevant to sensitivity to
rewards and Pavlovian bias. Second, an approach-avoidance taskmeasured the balance of seeking rewards versus avoiding losses
(Bach et al., 2014). This is likely to be relevant to everyday risk-taking by young people. Third, a risk preference task (Symmonds et al.,
2011) complemented this, focusing on widely accepted economic measures of risk-taking (Bach et al., 2020; Rigoli et al., 2016).
Fourth, we assessed inter-temporal discounting, learning about the preferences of others and finally peer influence (Moutoussis
et al., 2016; Nicolle et al., 2012). Discounting has been shown to be important in a range of psychiatric disorders (Bickel et al.,
2012) and so are issues of thinking about others (Sripada et al., 2009) and peer influence (Kerr et al., 2012). Fifth, we included an in-
formation gathering task (Moutoussis et al., 2011) as this has been consistently shown to be relevant to psychotic symptoms (Lincolne2 Neuron 109, 1–16.e1–e7, June 16, 2021
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10.1016/j.neuron.2021.04.019et al., 2010b) as well as the fundamentals of decision-making (Dayan, 2014). Sixth, a Trust Task was used as a measure of complex
social cognition especially relevant to disorders of interpersonal function (Fett et al., 2012; King-Casas et al., 2008). Seventh, a two
step task assessed the role of habitual versus planful mechanisms in decision-making (Daw et al., 2011). The battery was imple-
mented using MATLAB (MATLAB, 2012) using the Cogent toolbox (see acknowledgments). Trained research assistants directed
the participants through the battery.
In terms of remuneration, participants received a flat fee but were also (truthfully) told that they would be paid extra according to
their earnings in the tasks. They were informed that there would be a substantial amount of luck in each task, but those who
completed the tasks carefully would expect to earn about 2.5 pounds extra per task. Participants did not see earnings for each trial,
because tasks differed greatly in their delivery andwe did not want to display varying amounts of money to avoid additional Pavlovian
motivational effects. Instead, participants were told that ‘roughly, each good decision in each task is worth approximately the same’,
a statement which provided a reasonable reflection of the true state of affairs. The sole element of deception in the battery was that
during the interpersonal tasks participants were told that their play partner was a peer, whereas in reality it was a computer agent.
However these agents were simulating as closely as possible the performance of healthy people who had the same demographics as
the participants. Participants were debriefed at the end of all testing.
Earnings were added to their compensation for the day’s testing, except for the Interpersonal-Discounting task. Here, participants
were paid at one of their chosen delays, randomly chosen from all the trials in the task, if they chose a larger but delayed payment.
This was paid in Amazon vouchers.
The order of the tasks was subject to constrained randomization. We first piloted the battery in 15 participants, of whom we asked
detailed feedback as to how interesting and how tiring they found each task, as well as free-form comments. On the basis of this we
avoided putting the more tiring or less interesting tasks near the end of the battery, in order to minimize the effect of fatigue. This
resulted in eight different task sequences, one of which was given at random to participants. After the first 40 participants were re-
cruited we performed an interim analysis to compare performance in this battery of shortened tasks as compared to the full-length
versions. Performance in each task showed followed the pattern of performance in the original, except the Two-Step task. Here par-
ticipants as a group showed only just-detectable goal-directed decision-making. As this would greatly reduce the task’s usefulness
we improved the pre-task training and instructions and discarded this first 10% of data for this task, with satisfactory results.
Tasks lasted 8-30 min each, giving an overall duration of 2 3=4 – 2
3=4 h, including one obligatory break and as many extra between-
task breaks as the participant asked for. Good performance attracted proportionally greater fees in real money.
Key measures were first extracted from each task according to published methodologies. These key measures assess funda-
mental aspects of decision-making, namely sensitivity to rewards and losses, attitudes to risk, inter-temporal and reflection impul-
sivity, pro-sociality andmodel-basedness. 820 participants (including all scanned participants) yielded usable data across tasks. The
approach-avoidance task, the information gathering task, and the trust task required some adaptations that are listed below.
We were interested in whether common factors operated across domains of decision-making. We therefore pre-processed the
data to reduce strong correlations amongmeasures within-task, which would otherwise dominate the factor analysis, as is described
in the supplemental information. In total we formed 32 measures, listed in Tables 1 and S1.
The approach avoidance taskwas originally described in Bach et al. (2014) was adapted for the purposes of this study. Because of
time constraints we reduced the number of threat contexts from three to two, which we call two ‘predators’ corresponding to low and
high threat. Also, different from the previous study, epoch duration did not depend on threat level. That is, an epoch ended after a
random duration, independent of whether the predator woke up or not. Finally, the number of epochs was reduced to 1/3 of the orig-
inal, so that the task took about 23 min to complete.
Based on the previous work (Bach et al., 2014), we collected a large number of behavioral descriptive measures and performed an
exploratory factor analysis of these (substantially correlated) measures. We found that the first three factors could be meaningfully
interpreted in decision-making terms, namely as sensitivity to the level of threat in the environment (‘threat sensitivity’), sensitivity to
features increasing probability of loss within an environment (‘loss sensitivity’) and measures of overall performance (‘performance’).
As might be expected, this third ‘performance’ factor loaded more highly in d (Figure 1) but still did not exceed the threshold of 0.25
that we used for inclusion in confirmatory analyses (below).
The ‘cover story’ and graphics of the Information Gathering task were adapted from the work of Lincoln and coworkers (Lincoln
et al., 2010a, 2010b). On the basis of previous work (Moutoussis et al., 2011) we reduced the maximum number of samples of
information per trial in order to increase the impact of the approaching end (urgency). We first presented participants with an un-
costed-information gathering version of the task for 10 trials. This had deliberately non-specific instructions to maximize the chance
that participants would bring their own, subjective cost structure to bear and because, somewhat unexpectedly, such uncosted,
scarce-instruction versions of the task has produced some of the most consistent results in clinical and subclinical samples. We
then presented them with 10 trials with more specific instructions. Participants started with 100 points and had to pay 10 points
for each item of information they requested.We employed amaximum-likelihood fit of the bayesian-observer model fromMoutoussis
et al. (2011).
In order to analyze the Trust taskwe adapted themeasures described by Fett et al. (2012). Following these researchers, we consid-
ered whether participants increased or decreased their offer at each move in response to observing their partner increase or
decrease theirs. However we considered the fractional change in contribution, i.e., the change in the fraction of play-money that
could have been given. This entails the hypothesis that each player considers the other as ‘messaging’ them from a baseline of theirNeuron 109, 1–16.e1–e7, June 16, 2021 e3
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10.1016/j.neuron.2021.04.019financial means, not in absolute terms. We then considered the vector in the 2-dimensional space of (fractional-change-of-Investor
by fractional-change-of-Trustee) formed for each round of play. We classified this in the same way as Fett et al. (retaliating, repairing,
honoring, disrupting) as the angle between the vector and the change-of-Investor axis increased from 180 to 180 degrees. Again
using the (rather crude) approximation that strategy remains the same throughout the 10 rounds of the game, we added the vectors
for each of the rounds to determine the character of the game as a whole. The orientation of the resultant vector characterizes the
whole exchange – both Investor (our participant) and Trustee (the computer). As all investors played the same computer program, this
vector can be seen as the type of exchange that the participant elicited.
In the event, orientations showed a clear bimodal distribution, either around zero degrees (an exchange based on coaxing the
Trustee) or around3p/4. The latter represents an exchange where each party is responding to the other’s reduction in contribution
with their own reduction. We might speculate that participants attempt to signal ‘if you won’t be generous, I won’t either’. The two-
cluster distribution could in turn be fitted reasonably well with a single straight line spanning retaliatory to coaxing exchanges. The
‘trust building’ index in Tables 1 and 2 corresponds to the participant’s position along this line.
MRI data acquisition
MRI scans were acquired on three identical 3T whole-body MRI systems (Magnetom TIM Trio; VB17 software version; Siemens
Healthcare): two located in Cambridge and one located in London. Reliability of the MRI procedures across sites has been demon-
strated elsewhere (Weiskopf et al., 2013). Structural MRI scans were acquired using a multi-echo acquisition protocol with six equi-
distant echo times between 2.2 and 14.7 ms, and averaged to form a single image of increased signal-to-noise ratio (SNR); TR =
18.70 ms, 1.0 mm isotropic voxel size, field of view (FOV) = 256 3 256, and 176 sagittal slices with parallel imaging using GRAPPA
factor 2 in anterior-posterior phase-encoding direction. Resting-state blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) fMRI (rsfMRI) datawere
acquired using multi-echo acquisition protocol with three echo times (TE = 13, 31, 48 ms), TR of 2420 ms, 263 volumes, 3.8 mm
isotropic voxel size, 34 oblique slices with sequential acquisition and a 10% gap, FOV = 240 3 240 mm and matrix size = 64 3
64 3 34. The duration of the functional scan was approximately 11 min.
Connectivity Analysis
The rsfMRI data were denoised with multi-echo independent component analysis (ME-ICA) (Kundu et al., 2017). ME-ICA leverages
the echo time dependence of the BOLD signal to separate BOLD-related from artifactual signal sources, like head motion. The func-
tional images were normalized to MNI space by composing a rigid transformation of the average functional image to the participant’s
structural image and a non-linear transformation of the structural image to the MNI template, and finally smoothed with a 5 mm full-
width-at-half-maximum Gaussian kernel. Following Smith et al. (2015), group-ICA was applied to the pre-processed fMRI baseline
data to decompose it in 200 nodes, 32 of which were identified as artifacts by visual inspection and excluded. The remaining 168
nodes are either confined brain regions or networks formed by regions where BOLD signal time-series are strongly correlated. Mul-
tiple spatial regressions against the group-ICA spatial maps were used to estimate time-series for each network and subject, for both
baseline and follow-up scans. RsFC matrices (168 3 168 nodes) were then computed using partial correlation with limited L2 reg-
ularisation (Smith et al., 2011). All these preprocessing steps were conducted with the ME-ICA toolbox (https://afni.nimh.nih.gov/
pub/dist/src/pkundu/README.meica) and the FMRIB Software Library (FSL, https://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fslwiki/). As shown in Fig-
ure S4 and recent studies of FC reliability (Noble et al., 2017), overall reliability of individual functional connections is low, though
some connections displaymoderate to high reliability. We thus usedmultivariatemethods combiningmultiple FC values as a strategy
to compensate for the low FC of individual connections.
The obtained rsFC values were used as features in a sparse partial least-squares (SPLS) model to predict two outcome measures
of interest (decision acuity and IQ composite scores). SPLS (Chun and Keleş, 2010; ‘spls’ R library, https://cran.r-project.org/web/
packages/spls/) is a multivariate regression model that simultaneously achieves data reduction and feature selection. It has applica-
tion in datasets with highly correlated features and sample sizemuch smaller than the total number of features, as was the case in the
present study. SPLSmodels are governed by two parameters (number of latent components and a threshold controlling model spar-
sity) that were adjusted using a nested cross-validation scheme (i.e., using data in the training dataset only) with 10-folds (Figure 2).
Predicted scores were estimated by 20-fold cross-validation repeated 5 times. For each training-testing partition we performed the
following steps. To elucidate whether the predictions were driven by rsFC values independently of age, sex or covariates of no in-
terest (see below), we fitted a linear model to the training dataset and regressed out from the target variable (in both training and
testing datasets) age, sex and their interaction as well as brain volume, scanning site and head-motion-related parameters. Head
motion is known to originate spurious correlations that bias connectivity estimates and therefore (besides theME-ICA preprocessing
explained above) we regressed out average framewise displacement (FD), a summary index of the amount of in-scanner motion (Po-
wer et al., 2012), and the degrees of freedom resulting from the ME-ICA denoising, which may differ across subjects depending on
how much nuisance variance is removed from their data. As an additional control for head motion, subjects whose mean FD was
above 0.3 mm were not included in the analysis. We also standardized both training and testing data with respect to the mean
and standard deviation of the training data (separately for each feature). As a first step to filter out uninformative features and speed
up computations, only those significantly (p < 0.05) correlated with the outcome variable in the training dataset were entered in the
SPLS model. We then used a bagging strategy where data were resampled with replacement 200 times and as many SPLS models
were fitted to the resampled datasets, and their feature weights averaged to produce a final model. The purpose of this step was 1) toe4 Neuron 109, 1–16.e1–e7, June 16, 2021
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10.1016/j.neuron.2021.04.019improve the generalizability of the final average model and 2) to allow estimation of the stability of the feature weights selected. The
final, average model was used to compute the predicted scores for the testing partition. The same procedure was repeated for all
folds to obtain one predicted score for each subject, where the predicted score for each participant depended only on data from
other subjects in the sample. These procedures were implemented with R (https://www.r-project.org/) and MATLAB (https://
www.mathworks.com).
Network node community structure
To enhance our understanding of the anatomical distribution of the predictive connections, we performed a ‘virtual lesion’ analysis
(Dubois, et al., 2018), which entails assessing the performance of the model when it is trained only on subsets of connections instead
of the full ensemble. First, we partitioned the set of nodes into disjoint modules or communities (to some extent analogous to large-
scale functional networks; Smith et al., 2009) formed by nodes which displayed high connectivity among them but lower connectivity
with nodes in other modules. We obtained the community structure directly from our dataset instead of relying on previous partitions
that have been derived from adult connectomes (Ito et al., 2017; Power et al., 2011), because brain connectivity of adolescents and
adults is known to differ (Fair et al., 2009).
To produce the partition, we averaged the baseline rsFCmatrices across participants and removed negative entries. The resulting
matrix was submitted to the Louvain community detection algorithm for weighted graphs (Blondel et al., 2008) and this partition was
refined using a modularity fine-tuning algorithm (Sun et al., 2009). Since the algorithm is not deterministic, it was applied 100 times
and the results gathered in a nodes x nodes consensusmatrix that indicates the frequency bywhich the corresponding node pair was
assigned to the same module. The consensus matrix was partitioned repeatedly until convergence. The algorithm depends on a
parameter g that controls the resolution (which determines the ensuing number of modules). We adjusted this parameter to maximize
the normalized mutual information between solutions at different resolutions. The optimal value of g ensures the most stable parti-
tioning and in our dataset (g = 2.7) led to a solution with 14 modules, a number that yielded interpretable modules and is on par with
the cardinality used in previous studies. These analyses are similar to those reported in (Geerligs et al., 2015) andwere performedwith
the Brain Connectivity Toolbox (Rubinov and Sporns, 2010; http://www.brain-connectivity-toolbox.net) for MATLAB. Having parcel-
lated the connectome in the 14 modules, we trained the prediction model for each one of them using only connections implicating
nodes in thatmodule (i. e. either connections among nodes in themodule or connections between nodes in themodule and the rest of
the brain). We employed the same module decomposition in the analysis concerning the follow-up dataset.
QUANTIFICATION AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Derivation, validation and psychometric correlates of Decision Acuity
We tailored analysis to test the hypothesis that a few (around three) dimensions of covariation would meaningfully load across de-
cision-making measures, expecting reward sensitivity, risk preferences, goal-directedness and prosociality to be represented in
these dimensions. We allowed, however, the data to determine the number of factors in the model. We used an exploratory-confir-
matory approach to establish the structure of the factor model using the baseline data. Then, we made use of the longitudinal nature
of our sample to test the temporal stability and predictive validity of the key derived measure.
Task measures at baseline only were first transformed to near-normal marginal distributions using logarithmic or power-law trans-
forms, imputed for the small percentage of missing values using the R package ‘missMDA’, then randomly divided into a ‘discovery’
and ‘testing’ samples. N = 416 participants were used for exploratory common factor analysis (ECFA) and 414 were used for out-of-
sample testing. We found loadings on the first ECFA factor, likely to be most important, to vary smoothly across all parameters, and
the great majority of loadings to be lower than the conventional threshold of 0.4 used to construct structural equation models for
confirmatory FA (Muthén and Muthén, 2008). Items had high uniqueness, as expected. These results were much like the final to-
tal-sample FA illustrated in Figure 1. Therefore, rather than claim that certain decision parameters were important and others
were not in providing a measure of the underlying latent variable, we allowed for all decision-making items to contribute, recognizing
that individual item weights would be poorly estimated, but expecting that the resulting overall scores would be well estimated. We
tested this by comparing (i) discovery versus test samples and (ii) purposeful half-splits of the population with respect to sex and age
(see supplemental information, section B). The exploratory analysis furthermore suggested that our objective need not be to deter-
mine a ground-truth number of factors, as higher order factors were dominated by single tasks and hence were of no interest here.
Our criterion for including higher-order factors then was whether higher dimensional models were likely to result in better score es-
timates for the low-order factors, which were of interest.
The maximum number of factors for the exploratory-confirmatory analysis was 8, estimated by parallel analysis (Figure S1). The R
library ‘nFactors’, and specifically R functions ‘eigen’,’parallel’ and ‘nScree’ were used to estimate the scree-plot based number of
exploratory factors to retain illustrated in Figure S1. Based on these, models from 8 down to 1 factors were derived with function ‘fa’,
using ordinary least-squares to find minimum-residual (minres) solutions. The models estimated from the ECFA were then tested on
the confirmation dataset using structural equation modeling in R (Fox, 2006). Criteria of under-determination, Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC), and comparative fit index (CFI) were used to compare including an increasing number of factors. In the confirmatory
factor analysis, a threshold of 0.25 was adopted as very few loadings on the first factor exceeded the conventional threshold of 0.4
(See Figure 1 in themain text). Considering the test set of 414 participants only, we found that model fit as indexed by the BIC and CFINeuron 109, 1–16.e1–e7, June 16, 2021 e5
ll
OPEN ACCESS Article
Please cite this article in press as: Moutoussis et al., Decision-making ability, psychopathology, and brain connectivity, Neuron (2021), https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.neuron.2021.04.019improved from 1 to 4 factors. However, 5 factor and more complex model fits did not converge on the test set. According to these
criteria we considered a model of four factors to be most parsimonious and robust, but we also considered the stability of the latent
constructs derived tomake a final choice of factor-analyticmodel.Within the range of three to five factors, d scoreswere not sensitive
to the exact number of factors, scores being correlated with r > 0.9, p0, with the score obtained from the 4-factor solution. We thus
opted for a 4-factor model for all subsequent analyses.
We then tested whether decision acuity as a construct was stable with respect to (i) the random discovery/confirmation split (ii)
median-split age and (iii) sex using the baseline data. We examined how closely scores for a certain subgroup (below median age
for (ii), ‘Male’ for (iii)) based on ECFA of the group itself agreed with scores for the same individuals based on FA weights derived
from the opposite (i.e., above median age or ‘Female’) group. We examined the construct stability of decision acuity by correlating
component d scores on half the sample with the same scores derived from the first ECFA component on the other half of the sample.
Here wewere not primarily interested in the factor structure of decision-making, but in the stability of the construct of decision acuity.
We thus divided the sample into two subgroups either by age (at 19) or by sex. We argued that if the construct itself was stable across
age (and sex), then the decision acuity factor score for each participant could be calculated either using the factor loadings derived
from the participant’s own group or indeed the opposite one. Individuals with substantially differing scores would indicate that a
different latent construct organized decision-making across the subgroups. If, for example, d was an invariant latent construct
with respect to age, then the pattern of loadings derived from older participants would give the same scores when applied to younger
participants as and ECFA on the young participant data themselves (Figure S3). d was highly stable across the discovery-confirma-
tion random split (0.99 confidence interval for r(exploratory based on confirmatory loadings, own exploratory) = 0.976,0.985), as well
as age CIr(young|old, own young) = 0.969,0.9811). Its stability across gender was satisfactory but significantly lower, evidencing a
small degree of sexual dimorphism CIr(male|female, ownmale) = 0.820,0.887. Fit indicators were similar for the whole sample and for
each split (e.g., RMSEA 90%CIs for females, males, younger, older and all were 0.051-0.061, 0.052-0.062, 0.054-0.064, 0.046-0.056
and 0.052-0.058 respectively). None of the analyses was materially affected by excluding from the sample of 830 participants the 50
who had a diagnosis of DSM5 depression.
Finally, we tested for external validity of decision acuity in correlating with (iv) mental health scores for symptomatology and dis-
positions, using bifactor scores and (v) patterns of functional brain connectivity, as described in Results.
The follow-up battery did not contain one of the baseline tasks, and had minor differences (but the same derived parameters) for
two further tasks. In order to perform longitudinal analyses, we adopted a conservative approach, estimating a measure of decision
acuity based on the final stage of the baseline analysis, but retaining only the weights for the six tasks that were assessed longitu-
dinally.We checked that thismore approximatemeasure adequately captured individual variability of the baseline sample, whichwas
the case (r = 0.98, p undetectable) and therefore used in the longitudinal analysis baseline scores derived from these six tasks. We
then derived the follow-up decision acuity estimates as follows.We first applied the same approximate-gaussianization transforms to
each follow-up measure. Next, we z-scored each follow-up measure using the mean and standard deviation of the respective (trans-
formed) baseline measure. Finally, we applied the weights for these 6 tasks derived from the baseline factor analysis. Thus, we took
the follow-up measures of decision acuity to have exactly the same structure as baseline, so that it could be used to compare ab-
solute changes in this measure. Finally, in analyses correlating follow-up symptoms with decision acuity, and as decision acuity and
IQ were measured typically six months after symptoms and hypothesized to be trait-like, we interpolated follow-up decision acuity
and IQ measures to the time of symptom measurement.
For the longitudinal analysis, we used a linear mixed effects approach. As the structure of decision Acuity was fixed by the pro-
cedure above, we did not split the follow-up sample into test and discovery sets. We used Bayesian Information Criterion to select
the statistical models by which we tested for inter-relations between decision acuity and key psychometric variables. For all the
following analyses, N = 571 for the follow up sample. Developmental time in this accelerated longitudinal design is represented
both by age-at-recruitment, and by the time interval between test waves. Both recruitment procedures and development itself
may mean that these two measures of developmental age may in practice affect our dependent variables differently. We therefore
first checked if LME modeling over baseline and follow-up with age as a random effect, in addition to a random intercept for each
participant, improved model fit. In fact, it worsened model fit (BIC = 5974.5; logLik = 2965.512; versus BIC = 5960.0, logLik =
2965.529), so we did not include age as random effect in further analyses. In further analyses involving IQ, we used the raw matrix
and vocabulary WASI IQ subscores and modeled age explicitly, rather than use standardized IQ subscores. This is because we
noticed that the standardized WASI total IQ in our sample was associated with age (r Pearson = 0.135, p = 0.00011, r2 = 0.017) at
baseline. This indicates that our sample had a different age dependence of IQ scores than the reference one (Axelrod, 2002). There-
fore, we regressed d for raw IQ subscores while covarying for age, in effect accounting for variation in IQ ability independent of
whether this was due to age or self-selection.
We also formed a performance measure across tasks, in order to check the interpretation that d reflects better decision-making.
First, we excluded the discounting and Roulette tasks, as these specifically probed the balance of amounts won versus other dimen-
sions of the return, namely its delay and uncertainty respectively. Second, we excluded the Approach-Avoidance conflict task, as one
of the measures by which it entered the estimation of dwas judged to be too close to a performance measure already (the third com-
mon-factor scores of the within-task factor analysis; see above). Parenthetically, this measure loaded modestly in the expected di-
rection onto d, i.e., positively, with a weight of 0.24 and high uniqueness (Figure 1). We then t-scored winnings within each of the
Go-NoGo, Information Gathering, Investor-Trustee and Two-step tasks, and averaged these scores across tasks. The Pearsone6 Neuron 109, 1–16.e1–e7, June 16, 2021
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10.1016/j.neuron.2021.04.019raw and partial correlation table between this task-performance measure, d and WASI total IQ, shown in Table S2, supported the
interpretation of d as conducive to profitable decision-making above and beyond IQ.
Predictive performance of Connectivity Analysis
We assessed predictive performance as the Pearson correlation coefficient r between measured d and (cross-validated) predicted
d (dpr), averaged across repetitions of the cross-validation splits. After Fisher transformation, the null distribution of r should follow a
zero-centered Gaussian distribution. In order to appraise significance, we estimated the variance of this distribution by generating
100 random permutations of the target variable (Winkler et al., 2016) and repeating the model-fitting procedures mentioned above,
separately for each fold. We then derived p values for the observed r from the estimated null distribution. We assessed predictive
performance for a model based on the full set of connections, as well as for models trained on the subsets of connections corre-
sponding to the modules described in the previous subsection.
To demonstrate that the relationships between connectivity and decision acuity were stable over time and replicate, we used the
model estimated at baseline to predict d based on the follow-up rsFC data for modules that were significant at baseline. Given that
the data at baseline and follow-up are not independent, we kept the same cross-validation fold structure in both datasets, so that the
prediction of a subject at follow-up did not involve their own rsFC baseline data, as this would have inflated the estimates of predictive
performance at follow-up.
Connectivity patterns predictive of d versus IQ
For imaging analyses, we derived a composite score of IQ by averaging standardized vocabulary and matrix IQ subscores, rather
than using the standardized WASI score, because of two reasons. First, we wanted analyses involving both age and IQ to have a
straightforward interpretation where IQ represents a measure of raw ability, as opposed to age-standardized ability, and explicitly
test for age-dependence separately. Second, we found evidence (Results) that our sample was different from the original on which
standardized scores were derived, and hence the standardization procedure might be invalid. Next, we trained models both on the
complete set of connections and the subsets corresponding to the individual modules to predict the IQ composite scores, as we had
done previously to predict d, yielding IQpr, and assessed predictive performance for each of themodules separately. To compare the
connectivity patterns that were predictive of dwith those predictive of IQ, for each of themodules we assessed the partial correlation
between d and dprwhen controlling for IQ, and the partial correlation between IQ and IQprwhen controlling for d. In all these analyses
we corrected for age, sex and imaging-related confounds as above.Neuron 109, 1–16.e1–e7, June 16, 2021 e7
